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Abstract
This paper examines the extent of international headquarter relocations worldwide.
About 6 percent of all multinationals relocated their headquarter to another country in
the 1997-2007 period. The paper presents empirical evidence on the role of tax in these
relocation decisions. It considers a sample of 140 multinationals that relocated their head-
quarters over the past decade and compares them to a control group of 1943 multinationals
that have not done so. It is found that the additional tax due in the home country upon
repatriation of foreign profits has a positive effect on the probability of relocation. The
empirical results suggest that an increase in the repatriation tax by 10 percentage points
would raise the share of relocating multinationals by 2.2 percentage points, equivalent
to an increase in the number of relocations by more than one third. Furthermore, the
introduction of controlled foreign corporation legislation also has a positive effect on the
number of relocations.
Keywords: international taxation, headquarter relocation, multinational, corporate
inversion, controlled foreign corporation
JEL classifications: F23, H25, H32
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1 Introduction
On 15 april 2008, the FTSE 100 pharmaceutical group Shire announced moving its headquar-
ter from Basingstoke, U.K. to Dublin, Ireland. It came as a shock that such a prominent
company of British origin would repot the firm without much hesitation to become a foreign
multinational and many people wondered if the country had lost its competitive edge in at-
tracting business. These worries only increased as it turned out that the relocation of Shire
was not a unique case. About a dozen companies followed suit in the course of the year.
Many observers argued that the firms were attracted to Ireland by the lack of controlled for-
eign corporation (CFC) legislation, which is employed by other countries to counter abusive
deferral or profit shifting by multinational groups. The U.K. authorities, on the other hand,
had proposed more stringent CFC rules that would have resulted in taxation of large parts
of worldwide passive income on accrual. The U.K. government quickly caved in and shelved
the controversial parts of its tax reform.
These events illustrate the additional challenge that policy makers face if a multinational’s
domicile cannot be taken for granted. Not only do they have to take into account that
multinationals can shift investment, jobs, and profits across borders, but they also have to
consider that firms may vote with their feet and relocate headquarters if they are discontent
with the policy package they are presented with. Hence, it becomes essential for effective
policy formation to better understand the degree of headquarter mobility and the extent to
which international tax policy affects headquarter relocation decisions.
The purpose of this paper is, first, to measure the mobility of multinational headquarters
across borders, taking into account that corporate inversions — like Shire’s headquarter re-
location described above — are just a special case of cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) in general. In our dataset, about 6 percent of multinationals relocated headquarters
across borders in the 1997-2007 period.
We compare multinationals that relocated headquarters abroad to their immobile counter-
parts by means of binary regression techniques. We investigate to which extent the observed
2
relocations exhibit a tax avoidance motive. Two hypotheses are tested for in particular.
First, headquarter relocations may serve to avoid CFC rules because they constrain a multi-
national’s ability to defer taxes and shift profits within the group. The effect of CFC rules is
identified by exploiting variation in the introduction dates of CFC legislation across countries.
The empirical results support this first hypothesis as they indicate that the introduction of
CFC legislation increases the probability of relocating headquarters.
Second, headquarter relocations may serve to avoid residual taxes. These are imposed on
foreign profits by the multinational’s home country in addition to the taxes that have already
been paid in the country where the profits originally accrued. In order to identify the effect
of residual taxes on headquarter relocation, two groups are distinguished: on the one hand,
multinationals from countries that tax worldwide profits and provide credits for taxes paid
abroad and, on the other hand, multinationals from countries that exempt foreign-source
profits from taxation. The latter serve as a control group as they are not subject to residual
taxation. For the former group, low tax burdens of foreign subsidiaries proxy for high residual
taxation in the home country because the corresponding foreign tax credits fall short of the
home country’s tax claim on foreign profits. The empirical analysis finds that multinationals
with low-taxed foreign subsidiaries are more likely to relocate their headquarters if they reside
in countries with tax credit systems. This effect is absent for the control group of multina-
tionals from exemption countries. These findings support the hypothesis that headquarter
relocations are at least partly driven by the objective to avoid residual taxes.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 frames the research question in the relevant previous
literature. Section 3 reports the scope of multinational headquarter relocations and describes
the dataset. Section 4 specifies the tax incentives that affect the choice of location for multi-
national headquarters. Section 5 develops the empirical approach; the empirical results are
discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 offers a conclusion.
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2 Previous literature
Between 1999 and 2002, the U.S. experienced a wave of corporate inversions in which U.S.
multinationals engaged in artificial M&A transactions with the sole purpose of relocating
their headquarters abroad. In these transactions, a new foreign parent company is put on
top of the multinational’s corporate structure without a change in ultimate shareholders.
The previous U.S. headquarter becomes a subsidiary. Other parts of the multinational may
also come under direct control of the new parent firm. The new structure may enable the
multinational to bypass residual taxation in the U.S. when repatriating foreign profits to
the ultimate parent firm. Initially, the administration was not too worried about corporate
inversions as it perceived the inverting firms as trying to create a level playing field with
competitors from countries with a territorial tax system that exempt foreign profits from
taxation. This point of view is exemplified by Boise and Koenig (2002).
Subsequently, however, concerns emerged that the inverting firms were rather trying to dodge
the constraints of CFC legislation and interest allocation rules. Sheppard (2002) and Thomp-
son (2002) represent this point of view, arguing that the true cause of inversions lies in
the desire to evade CFC rules which result in non-deferral of taxes on foreign-source pas-
sive income and which hamper profit shifting from the U.S. (or other high tax locations) by
means of interest stripping or royalty payments. Following a report by the Department of
the Treasury (2002) and several House and Senate hearings, the U.S. has repeatedly enacted
legislation with the purpose to inhibit these corporate inversions without impeding ‘proper’
cross-border mergers and acquisitions.1 So far, this reaction appears to have prevented any
further corporate inversions after 2002.
Desai and Hines (2002) empirically examine the role of taxation in 26 corporate inversions
of U.S. multinationals in the 1982–2002 period. They show that the foreign subsidiaries of
inverting firms typically face low tax rates which supports the hypothesis that inverting firms
1See the Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002, H.R. 3884, 107th Cong.; the Save America’s Jobs Act
of 2002, H.R. 3922, 107th Cong.; the Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002, H.R. 4756, 107th Cong.; and the No
Tax Breaks for Corporations Renouncing America Act of 2002, H.R. 4993, 107th Cong.; and the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Harvard Law Review, 2005).
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seek to avoid residual taxation in the U.S. Furthermore, they find larger firms and highly
leveraged firms more likely to expatriate. The latter may be explained by U.S. firms having
to partly allocate domestic expenses like interest charges against foreign income. Hence, these
expenses become non-deductible. The deductability of interest payments as an incentive for
headquarter relocation is further emphasized by Seida and Wempe (2004) who examine the
financial consequences of 12 corporate inversions. They find that firms’ effective tax rates
decline substantially following inversion due to U.S. earnings strippings, in particular via
intercompany debt.
The present paper contributes to this literature by broadening the focus from corporate
inversions to multinational headquarter relocations in general. As the U.S. example illustrates,
it may be feasible to prevent corporate inversions from occurring. However, the incentives
for headquarter relocation still persist and their effects may spill over into general cross-
border M&A transactions, which governments may be hesitant to interfere with. The question
is whether the incentives that cause corporate inversions — either avoiding residual home
country taxation or constraining CFC rules — are sufficiently strong to have an impact on
headquarter relocations that take place via regular M&As.
A related question is addressed by Huizinga and Voget (2009): cross-border mergers create
new frictions in the form of double taxation of dividend flows between the two merging entities.
They show that cross-border M&As tend to take the form that minimizes the additional
burden.2 However, they do not address the question if a given multinational is more or less
likely to engage in cross-border M&As due to its current corporate structure or location.
Other studies, such as Holloway and Wheeler (1991), Shilton and Stanley (1999), Strauss-
Kahn and Vives (2005), Lovely et al. (2005), and Davis and Henderson (2008), consider
national (sub-) headquarter relocations or agglomerations. However, they focus exclusively on
headquarter and subsidiary headquarter relocations on the national level, mostly in the U.S.
2More specifically, a country’s likelihood of hosting the headquarter following a merger between a domestic
firm and a foreign firm decreases if the country imposes high double taxation on foreign source income. This
firm-level observation is reflected in aggregate cross-border M&A numbers: Acquirers are less active in those
foreign countries from which dividend repatriations would incur relatively high double taxes.
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3 Survey of headquarter relocations and data description
The dataset for the empirical analysis is drawn from the database Orbis which contains
extensive financial and ownership information for firms worldwide. The ownership information
allows the linking of parent firms to domestic and foreign subsidiaries, which may be owned
directly or through chains of ownership.3 For the purpose of this study, a headquarter firm is
defined as the residence of a firm for which the majority of shares are owned by individuals
(and not by corporate entities).4 These headquarter firms are relevant because it is the place
where a group’s profits leave the corporate sector and enter personal income as dividends are
paid out. Headquarter firms are defined as multinational if they control at least one foreign
subsidiary. Based on these definitions, columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 1 report the number
of firms, headquarter firms, and multinational headquarter firms per country registered by
Orbis in the year 2005.5 Only firms with total assets of at least 2 million Euro are taken into
account.
Headquarters relocate to another country either if a headquarter firm sells its assets to a for-
eign company or alternatively if the firm’s shareholders sell their shares to a foreign company
in exchange for shares or in exchange for cash. Similar to the corporate inversions described
previously, the multinational group is subsequently controlled by a foreign headquarter firm.
Such cross-border M&A transactions are covered by the Zephyr database, which allows the
tracking down of the multinationals whose headquarter relocated to another country. Col-
umn (4) in Table 1 reports the number of relocating multinational headquarters in the period
between 1997 and 2007 that were registered by the M&A database Zephyr and that could
be linked via company identifiers to financial information in the Orbis database. Comparing
the number of relocating multinational headquarters to the immobile stock of multinationals
3Only majority-owned subsidiaries are taken into account when constructing groups of firms. A subsidiary
is majority-owned if the indirect share of ownership is greater than 50 percent.
4Orbis reports one residence per firm. Hence, it must be assumed that the place of incorporation and the
tax residence coincide at that address.
5Only countries with at least one relocating multinational are listed. The balance sheet data extends only up
to 2005, but 87 multinationals relocated between 2005 and 2007. In order to allow a comparison of relocating
to immobile headquarters from the perspective of 2007, these multinationals are not listed in column (3) but
in column (4) together with the multinationals that relocated prior to 2005.
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(column 3 and 4 in Table 1) shows that from 1997 until 2007 about six percent of all multina-
tionals relocate their headquarter to another country.6 To give a more detailed perspective,
Table 2 shows a cross table linking the country of origin and the country of destination for
multinational headquarter relocations for the most relevant countries.
The 5768 firm groups that can be identified as multinationals in the Orbis database constitute
the population for the empirical analysis. The necessary distinction between headquarter
entities and foreign subsidiaries requires unconsolidated financial reporting and balance sheet
plus earnings information for at least one foreign subsidiary. This reduces the sample size to
2083 multinationals, of which 140 relocate their headquarter to another country. The financial
data for relocating firms are drawn from the financial report one year prior to the headquarter
relocation.7 For the control group of non-relocating firms, financial data are taken from a
financial report drawn at random from the years 1996 – 2005.
The headquarter relocations registered by the Zephyr database generally encompass changes
in the ultimate shareholder structure. That distinguishes these data from the corporate
inversions considered by Desai and Hines (2002) or Seida and Wempe (2004) which are a
special case of headquarter relocations because the acquiring foreign firm has in the end the
same shareholders as the previous headquarter firm. Broadening the focus from corporate
inversions to general cross-border M&As is desirable because the important question here
is whether the tax-related incentives that have been found to motivate corporate inversions
are also relevant for regular M&A transactions. The tax incentives that affect multinational
headquarter location decisions are explained in more detail in the following section.
6Unfortunately, we have no data on the growth of stock of multinational firms. A growing number of
observations in the Orbis database over time may be attributed to a better data coverage or to a genuine
growth in the stock of firms.
7The announcement date of the corresponding M&A transaction is taken to be the relevant date. Reloca-
tions announced in 2007 are associated with financial reports from 2005 as this is the last available year for
financial reports in the data.
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4 Headquarter location and international taxation
Suppose multinational i has its headquarter firm in home country h and a subsidiary firm
in country f . In principle, the home country has the right to tax the multinational’s overall
income on a worldwide basis.8 In practice, however, some countries only tax a multinational’s
domestically generated income on a territorial basis. The selection of the headquarter loca-
tion thus affects whether the multinational’s income generated outside the home country is
potentially subject to additional taxation by the home country.
Income generated in subsidiary country f is first taxed in that country at an effective corporate
tax rate τ fi , leaving a share 1− τ fi of this income to be reinvested or repatriated to the parent
firm in the form of dividends. The effective tax rate τ fi differs from the statutory corporate
tax rate conditional on firm-specific circumstances like capital intensity.9
Home country h potentially taxes the headquarter firm’s foreign dividend income at a cor-
porate tax rate τh. In practice, however, most countries provide some form of international
double tax relief. If the home country operates a territorial or source-based tax system, it
effectively exempts foreign-source income from taxation. In this instance, there is no double
taxation. Alternatively, the home country operates a worldwide or residence-based system.
In this instance, the home country taxes the worldwide income of its resident multinationals,
but it may provide double tax relief in the form of a foreign tax credit for taxes already paid
in subsidiary country f . The OECD model tax convention, which summarizes recommended
practice, gives countries the option between an exemption and a foreign tax credit as the only
two ways to relieve double taxation.10
8Strictly speaking, the home country only has the right to tax entities within its borders: hence, the
headquarter firm and national subsidiaries. However, under certain conditions provided by controlled foreign
corporation rules, the home country can tax the headquarter directly for profits accumulated in foreign sub-
sidiaries which are deemed to be under the control of the headquarter — even if the foreign profits have not
been repatriated yet.
9The subsidiary country f , in addition, may apply a non-resident dividend withholding tax to dividends
repatriated to country h at a rate ωhf . There are too many bilateral relationships in the current dataset to
take withholding taxes into account. This should have only minor effects on the empirical results as most
relationships are covered by double tax treaties which provide for very low or zero withholding tax rates for
substantial shareholdings. See Huizinga and Voget (2009) for the applicable withholding taxes between 30
countries including the U.S., Japan and most European countries.
10See OECD (2005) for a recent version of the model tax convention.
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The foreign tax credit reduces domestic taxes on foreign source income one-for-one with the
taxes already paid abroad. Foreign tax credits in practice are limited to prevent the domestic
tax liability on foreign source income from becoming negative. The multinational i is in an
excess tax credit position and pays no additional tax in the home country if τ fi ≥ τh. In all
other cases, the double tax rate with respect to the foreign pretax profit equals τh−τ fi . With
more than one foreign subsidiary, the multinational can be in an excess tax credit position
with respect to some subsidiaries but not with respect to others. Generally, however, tax
averaging across subsidiaries is implicitly or explicitly allowed for so that foreign subsidiaries’
tax payments and profits are aggregated before tax credits are calculated.11 In that case, the
multinational does not pay any double tax if τ fi ≥ τh, where τ fi is the foreign subsidiaries’
average effective tax rate of multinational i. In all other cases, the double tax rate equals
τh − τ fi . Hence, the double tax burden is firm-specific and inversely related to τ fi . This
firm-specific variation is exploited in the empirical analysis to identify the effect of residual
taxation.
Table 3 reports statutory corporate income tax rates in 2005 and the method of double tax
relief that home countries generally apply to dividend repatriations from countries with which
a tax treaty has been concluded. Generally, countries do not vary the method of relief across
countries with established tax treaties.12 As a rough guide, smaller countries tend to exempt
dividend repatriations whereas larger countries tend to provide foreign tax credits as double
taxation relief. Furthermore, most European continental countries tend to exempt dividend
repatriations.13
11The U.S. used to hamper tax averaging somewhat by allocating foreign subsidiaries’ income into nine
different “baskets” conditional on certain income and subsidiary characteristics. Tax averaging only applied
within each basket but not across baskets. (See Grubert et al. (2005) for more detail.) Since 2007, the number
of baskets has been reduced to two — an active and a passive income basket — which decreases the risk
of having excess tax credits in one of the baskets. The U.K. explicitly allowed on-shore pooling of dividend
streams in 2001. Before, U.K. multinationals achieved tax averaging by pooling dividend streams abroad
in so-called “mixer companies” before eventual repatriation to the U.K. Ireland has always allowed on-shore
dividend pooling. Japan also allows tax averaging as it gives tax credits on an overall basis (in contrast to
giving tax credits according to a country-by-country approach).
12Note that the method of double tax relief for dividends is not solely determined by the tax treaty itself.
The domestic tax code may provide more generous double tax relief, although the domestic rules may be
conditional on the existence of a double tax treaty. For example, Canada, Finland and Spain exempt foreign
subsidiaries’ dividends from taxation conditional on the existence of a tax treaty.
13Russia switched from providing foreign tax credits to exempting dividend repatriations in 2007.
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Without special legislation, countries only tax domestic entities’ income. Taxation of foreign
subsidiaries’ profits is deferred until they are repatriated to domestic entities. It is an em-
pirical question by how much the option of deferral alleviates the burden of additional home
country taxation. On the one hand, dividend repatriations increased eightfold when the U.S.
temporarily exempted foreign-source dividends for 85 percent from taxation in the frame-
work of the American Jobs Creation Act 2004. The large increase signals that the credit and
deferral system represents a binding constraint for U.S. multinationals. On the other hand,
Altshuler and Grubert (2002) argue that the burden of residual taxation of foreign-source div-
idends is rather small. (Eventually, the alleviating character of deferral should be captured
in the empirical analysis by weaker coefficients than in the absence of deferral.)
Countries can restrict the potential abuse of deferral by enacting CFC rules. These provide
conditions under which the parent firm is taxed on specific kinds of foreign subsidiaries’
profits even when no repatriation takes place. Many countries that generally exempt foreign-
source dividends from taxation have enacted CFC legislation as well. For these countries,
CFC rules are naturally not meant to restrict deferral but they are supposed to protect the
country’s tax base against profit shifting. Under certain conditions, CFC legislation causes
foreign subsidiary income to be taxed on accrual instead of being exempted as usual. In this
manner, the CFC rules act as a backstop to imperfect transfer pricing regulations and thin
capitalization rules.14
The typical CFC legislation is targeted at foreign subsidiaries’ “tainted income”: normally
passive income such as dividends, income from interest or royalties, or capital gains. The
definition of tainted income could be further restricted (by excluding certain categories of
passive income) or extended (by including profits from intra-group transactions or profits
that are not locally sourced).
The scope of CFC rules can also be restricted by specifying country- or subsidiary-specific
conditions which must be satisfied before CFC rules apply. Table 4 summarizes these neces-
sary conditions for existing CFC legislations. Every row in Table 4 represents one CFC rule
14This aspect of CFC rules is, of course, not only appreciated by exemption countries but also by foreign
tax credit countries.
10
and all listed conditions have to be satisfied before the CFC legislation triggers taxation of
subsidiary profits at the parent firm level. Several countries appear more than once in Table 4
because they have more than one CFC rule operating simultaneously.
Column (1) indicates if a black- or whitelist is employed to identify low-tax jurisdictions.15
Similarly, column (2) reports if there exists a minimum tax burden at which subsidiary income
should be taxed. CFC rules do not apply if that standard is met. Such a minimum tax can
be defined as an absolute threshold or relative to the home country’s tax rate. Furthermore,
tainted income may have to surpass thresholds relative to a subsidiary’s profit or sales before
CFC rules apply. These thresholds are reported in columns (3) and (4). Instead of specifying
a specific threshold, CFC rules may test the general nature of a subsidiary’s economic activity.
In this case, CFC rules do not result in taxation if the subsidiary’s “main” business is judged
to be untainted. Column (5) indicates the existence of such a test. Besides the conditions
listed in columns (1)–(5), a test of control also has to be satisfied before CFC rules take effect.
This ensures that the parent firm indeed exerts sufficient control over the foreign subsidiary.
If CFC rules take effect, the parent firm is often only taxed on the tainted share of subsidiary’s
profits and tax credits for foreign taxes paid are provided. In some cases, as indicated by
column (6) of Table 4, the parent firm is taxed on the subsidiary’s total profits — active
income as well as passive income. Column (7) reports CFC rule characteristics which do not
fit into the categories described above but have a strong impact on the scope or sensitivity of
CFC rules. Finally, the description of CFC rules is completed by Table 5 which contains the
complementary details.
Exit taxes are another class of taxes that matter for headquarter relocation decisions. First,
there can be exit taxes at the level of the shareholder. Control over the multinational passes
to the new headquarter firm as it acquires the previous parent firm. Existing shareholders
exchange their shares in the multinational for shares in the new parent firm or for cash.
The potential capital gains tax works as an exit tax which may prevent some headquarter
15A greylist is comparable to a whitelist although it imposes additional conditions on the legal type of firm
before subsidiaries are disregarded for CFC purposes.
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relocations.16 After the new parent firm is put on top of the ownership tree, the multinational
may want to reorganize in order to bypass the former headquarter location when repatriating
dividends to the new parent firm. If the capital gains taxes on such intra-group transfers of
assets are not waived, they work as an exit tax that may prevent the headquarter relocation
in the first place.17 This exit tax is less effective if the repatriation of foreign profits can
be accomplished via interest or royalty payments that bypass the former parent firm. A
reorganization of subsidiary ownership is not necessary in this case. The following empirical
analysis does not take exit taxes explicitly into account. Instead, they are controlled for by
country-, year-, or country/year pair-specific effects.
5 Empirical specification
The previous discussion of international taxation has identified two particular incentives for
which multinationals may want to relocate their headquarters across borders. First, multi-
nationals have an incentive to avoid CFC rules that constrain their ability to defer taxes
and shift profits within the group. Second, multinationals from tax credit countries have an
incentive to avoid residual taxes on their foreign-source dividends. This section introduces
the empirical specification that is used to test whether these two incentives are reflected in
the decisions to relocate headquarters
The dependent variable yi takes the value one if multinational i relocated its headquarter
to another country between 1997 and 2007. Otherwise the value is zero. The summary
statistics in Table 6 show that about 6.7 percent of the observations relocate headquarters.
The conditional probability of headquarter relocations is estimated by way of the following
16Alternatively, the previous parent firm may sell its assets directly to the new parent firm, but capital gains
taxes are then incurred at the corporate level.
17The following serves as a specific example of exit taxes at different levels. In 1996, the U.S. adjusted the
Internal Revenue Code Sec. 367 so that U.S. shareholders have to recognize a capital gain on the transfer
of shares to a foreign corporation if the transferors own more than 50 percent of the foreign corporation’s
stock after the transaction. A further exit tax was introduced by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
which provided that — following an acquisition of a U.S. firm — the foreign parent is treated as a domestic
corporation if it is at least 80 percent owned by the former target firm’s stockholders. This would cancel the
tax benefits of inversions. If former target firm’s stockholders own at least 60 percent but less than 80 percent
of the foreign parent firm, taxes on intra-group transfers of assets to the foreign parent firm cannot be offset
by foreign tax credits or net operating losses.
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logistic regression model
Pr[yi = 0|xi] = exp(x
′
iβ)
1 + exp(x′iβ)
, (1)
where xi is a vector of explanatory variables described in the following and β is the corre-
sponding vector of coefficients, which is estimated by maximum likelihood.
The first variable of interest is the average effective tax rate of a multinational’s foreign sub-
sidiaries, τ fi , which is defined as the aggregate tax payments of foreign subsidiaries divided
by the aggregate pretax profits of foreign subsidiaries.18 As described in the previous section,
τ fi is the appropriate measure in the presence of numerous foreign subsidiaries because tax
averaging is generally allowed for in determining foreign tax credits. Low values of τ fi cor-
respond to high residual taxes on foreign-source dividends for multinationals residing in tax
credit countries. For this group, the coefficient of τ fi should exhibit a negative coefficient if
the incentive to avoid residual taxes contributes towards headquarter relocations. No such
effect is expected for multinationals from exemption countries. In order to allow for different
coefficients between the two groups, the variable τ fi is interacted with the dummy variables
Ei and Ci which are binary variables that indicate if a multinational resides in an exemption
(Ei = 1) or credit country (Ci = 1). Including multinationals from exemption countries as a
control group serves to validate whether τ fi is indeed a proxy for residual taxation of repatri-
ated profits. In this case, the variable should only affect the treatment group of multinationals
from credit countries and not the control group of multinationals from exemption countries.
However, if the effect of τ fi is similar for both groups, it captures some other firm-specific
effect which is not related to residual taxation of foreign profits.
The imputed tax rate tfi becomes infeasible if the numerator of the tax rate is negative, or the
denominator of the tax rate is non-positive, or if the implied tax rate is above 100 percent.
In these cases, tfi is set to zero and three dummy variables are introduced to distinguish the
cause of the problem. The variable NegTaxi takes the value one if the sum of the foreign
18The accounting measure of taxation serves as a proxy for taxes actually paid for which information is
lacking.
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subsidiaries’ tax payments is negative. The variable NegProfiti takes the value one if the
sum of the foreign subsidiaries’ pretax profits is negative. The variable Xratei equals one if
the implied tax rate is above 100 percent.
The second variable of interest is the binary variable CFCi which indicates the presence of
CFC legislation in a multinational’s home country. The variable is equal for all multinationals
from the same country and year. As explained previously, CFC rules may enforce taxation of
foreign profits on accrual or constrain a multinational in its profit shifting activities. Hence,
the variable CFCi should exhibit a positive coefficient if the incentive to avoid CFC rules is
reflected in the decision to relocate headquarters abroad.
Furthermore, all specifications include the following control variables. Sizei is the logarithm
of the multinational’s total turnover and controls for firm size. In the study by Desai and Hines
(2002) firm size had a positive effect on the likelihood to relocate headquarters. Leveragei is
the ratio of long term debt to total assets. In Desai and Hines’s study, high leverage had a
positive effect on relocations which they attributed to U.S. multinationals having to allocate
their interest costs partly against foreign source profits. The variable EoAi represents earnings
over total assets and controls for a multinational’s profitability. Including this variable ensures
that the imputed tax rates do not accidently proxy for profitability as profitable firms tend
to exhibit higher imputed tax rates. Finally, Hightechi is a dummy variable indicating
that a firm’s core business is categorized as knowledge-intensive or high technology industry
according to OECD and Eurostat classifications. Controlling for this variable ensures that
the potential relationship between headquarter mobility and taxation of foreign profits is
not simply caused by firms in the high-tech sector. These firms may exhibit a different
degree of mobility as well as lower taxes on foreign profits due to the prominent role of
intangible assets.19 Table 6 contains the summary statistics for the whole sample, Table 7
splits the summary statistics with respect to relocating and non-relocating multinationals.
The description of the variables and data sources can be found in Table 8.
19For example, Grubert (2003) finds that income derived from R&D based intangibles accounts for about
half of the income shifted from high-tax to low-tax countries.
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6 Empirical results
Regression (1) in Table 9 does not distinguish between multinationals from credit and ex-
emption countries. The variable tfi , which measures the average effective tax rate of foreign
subsidiaries, has only an insignificant effect on the probability to relocate headquarters.
Regression (2) allows for a different effect of that variable conditional on the multinational
residing in a credit or exemption country. The results show that lower average effective tax
rates of foreign subsidiaries increase the likelihood of headquarter relocation for multination-
als from tax credit countries. For this group, the coefficient with respect to the average
effective foreign tax rate (Ci × tfi ) has a value of -3.99 significant at the one percent level.
This corresponds to a marginal effect of -0.22 such that a one percentage point decrease in
effective foreign subsidiary tax rates increases the likelihood of headquarter relocation by 0.22
percentage points.20 The corresponding increase in the number of relocating headquarters is
3.3 percent. For multinationals headquartered in countries exempting dividend repatriations
from taxation (Ei × tfi ), the coefficient is insignificant. A Wald test indicates that the coeffi-
cients are different between the two groups at the one percent level. These findings support
the hypothesis that headquarter relocations are at least partly driven by the objective to
avoid residual taxes.
Turning to the control variables, the variable NegTaxi, which indicates a negative amount
of aggregate foreign subsidiaries taxes, seems to have a weakly positive effect on headquarter
relocation. However, this effect is not robust across different specifications. The significant
coefficient of the dummy variableNegProfiti indicates that an aggregate loss making position
of foreign subsidiaries decreases the probability of headquarter relocation. This may reflect
that the firm is at a stage at which the headquarter location is of secondary importance. For
example, the losses of foreign subsidiaries could be due to start-up investments. Interestingly,
the variable Hightechi has a significantly negative effect on the probability of headquarter
relocation. This may reflect that collocation of headquarters and highly specific labor skills
20The regression model is non-linear, so marginal effects vary across observations. The marginal effect is
reported at the sample average of the control variables.
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are important in the production process of these firms. The remaining control variables of
regression (2) have insignificant coefficients.
Regression (3) introduces the second variable of interest: the variable CFCi indicates the
presence of controlled foreign corporation rules in the country and year that observation i
relates to. The corresponding coefficient is positive but appears to be insignificant.
In order to exclude that the results are biased by unobserved country-specific effects, regression
(4) includes a set of country dummy variables. As mentioned earlier, the indicator for negative
aggregate tax payments, NegTaxi, loses significance. On the other hand, firm size now
exhibits a positive effect significant at the 10 percent level. Larger firms are more likely to
relocate their headquarters abroad which is in line with evidence given by Desai and Hines
(2002). The effect of controlling for country-specific effects on the coefficient of CFCi is
profound: it increases strongly in size and significance. Hence, the introduction of CFC
rules increases the likelihood of headquarter relocation. The coefficients of Ci× tfi and Ei× tfi
remain unaffected by the introduction of country dummy variables. These results consistently
indicate that multinationals with low-taxed foreign subsidiaries are more likely to relocate
their headquarters if they reside in countries with tax credit systems. This effect is absent
for the control group of multinationals from exemption countries.
All following regressions take country-specific effects into account. Regression (5) in Table 10
employs total assets instead of turnover as a measure for firm size. However, the coefficient of
Assetsi is insignificant. In all other respects, the results remain very similar. Regression (6)
includes the explanatory variable Hometaxi, which is the home country’s statutory corporate
income tax rate. Its coefficient is insignificant and the other estimates remain unaffected.
In regression (7), the dependent variable is defined such that only headquarter relocations
to exemption countries are considered relevant. (Hence, yi only takes the value one if multi-
national i relocated its headquarter to an exemption country. Otherwise, yi = 0.) Then
the coefficient of Ci × tfi has a value of -7.65 and is lower than before. The stronger effect
suggests that the negative relationship between Ci × tfi and the probability of headquarter
relocation indeed reflects the incentive to avoid residual taxation of low-taxed foreign profits
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as it is especially driven by relocations to exemption countries. The effect of CFC rules on
headquarter relocation, however, is not driven by relocations to exemption countries. The
coefficient of CFCi is insignificant. This may reflect that tax credit countries are suitable
destinations for avoiding stringent CFC legislation. Lang et al. (2004) argue that exemption
countries put more importance on CFC rules as they have a larger need to protect their tax
base.21
Another concern may be that the results are due to multinational headquarters being attracted
to exemption countries for other reasons that correlate with exemption systems— for example,
low corporate income tax rates. Hence, the dependent variable in regression (8) is defined
such that only relocations to exemption countries with a tax rate not below 30 percent are
considered relevant. In all other cases, yi takes the value zero. The estimation results are
similar to regression (7).
Regression (9) and (10) test the sensitivity of estimates with respect to assumptions about
the distribution of error terms. Regression (9) assumes that the regression’s error term is
normally distributed such that the conditional probability of relocating headquarters is given
by a probit regression. The results are very similar to the logit regression (4). The small pro-
portion of relocating headquarters with respect to immobile headquarters may be of concern.
Hence, regression (10) takes the skewed dependent variable into account by assuming an ex-
treme value distribution for the error term. The conditional inverse probability of relocating
headquarters abroad is then given by
Pr(yi = 0 | xi) = 1− exp− exp (xiβ) . (2)
The results are not sensitive to distributional assumptions. The marginal effects estimated
by regression (9) and (10) are very similar to regression (4).
21The wave of corporate inversions in 2008 mentioned in the introduction supports this argument. The
inverting firms were attracted to Ireland for its lack of CFC rules. Furthermore, the U.K.’s failed proposal to
introduce more stringent CFC rules was caused by the increased desire to protect its tax base as it planned to
switch from a tax credit to an exemption system.
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The following regressions allow for different kinds of specific effects than country-specific
ones. Regression (11) in Table 11 adds year dummy variables to the specification. The use of
country dummy and year dummy variables should not raise any identification issues — such
as the incidental parameters problem described by Neymann and Scott (1948) or Lancaster
(2000) — because the sample size is determined by the number of firms.
Regressions (12) to (14) are conditional logit regressions which allow controlling for a larger
number of fixed effects. In regression (12), the maximum likelihood is conditioned on the
country-specific proportion of relocating firms.22 This accounts for country-specific effects
without employing dummy variables. In a similar way, regression (13) controls for country/industry-
pair specific effects, where industries are defined by the sectors of the International Standard
Industrial Classification (United Nations, 2002). Finally, regression (14) controls for any
country/year-pair specific effect. As the variable CFCi does not vary across firms from the
same country/year-pair, it is completely captured by the specific effects and cannot be ana-
lyzed.
The estimation results of regression (11) to (14) are very similar to the benchmark regres-
sion (4). The estimates are robust to controlling for unobservable effects beyond country-
specific effects. In particular, Ci × tfi has a significantly negative effect whereas Ei × tfi
remains insignificant. Low-taxed foreign subsidiaries increase the likelihood of relocating
headquarters only for multinationals from tax credit countries. Hence, headquarter reloca-
tions are motivated — at least partly — by the objective to avoid residual taxes on foreign
profits. The variable CFCi consistently has a significantly positive effect on the probability
of headquarter relocation. The presence of CFC legislation appears to have a deterring effect
on multinational headquarters.
22Conditioning the likelihood on the country-specific number of successes and failures results in Chamber-
lain’s (1980) fixed-effects logit estimator.
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7 Conclusion
Within the last decade, six percent of the multinationals in our sample have relocated their
headquarter to another country. With such a turnover, countries have an incentive to present
themselves as attractive headquarter locations given that hosting headquarters has certain
positive externalities like an increased demand for skilled labor, a larger tax base, or even
a better representation of the country’s interest in the decision making of the multinational
firm. Enacting CFC legislation or imposing double taxation on repatriated profits, however,
makes a country less attractive as a headquarter location. The empirical results in this paper
show that the introduction of CFC rules increases the likelihood of multinational headquarter
relocations. Furthermore, multinationals residing in countries with tax credit systems are
more likely to relocate their headquarter if they derive profits from lowly taxed foreign sub-
sidiaries. This reflects their incentive to avoid residual taxation of foreign profits in the home
country. A one percentage point decrease in foreign effective tax rates increases the likelihood
of relocation by 0.22 percentage points. By way of illustration, the U.S. federal corporate in-
come tax rate has been at 35 percent since 1986. Meanwhile, the OECD average of statutory
corporate income tax rates has decreased from 37 percent in 1996 to 27 percent in 2008. A
10 percentage points decrease in the foreign subsidiaries’ tax burden of a U.S. multinational
would imply a 2.2 percentage points increase in its probability of relocating headquarters
abroad within the next decade. Compared to an average likelihood of 6 percent, that is an
increase of more than one third.
The most visible expression of the incentive to relocate headquarters are corporate inversions
as those that occurred in the U.S. between 1999 and 2002 or those that have taken place in the
U.K. since 2008. The U.S. successfully stopped any further inversions by introducing more
stringent exit taxes and a strong preference for national firms in government procurement.
The U.K. is in a less fortunate situation, because — due to the constraints of European
Community law — national exit taxes must not infringe upon the freedom of establishment,
one of the general principles in the EU Internal Market.23 As a consequence, the U.K. cannot
23The freedom of establishment is set out in Article 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
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discriminate against relocating firms. Any tax that could serve as a barrier to exit would
have to apply to the whole set of firms, which may not be desirable. Even if a country
manages to inhibit corporate inversions, the incentives for headquarter relocations spill over
into general cross-border mergers and acquisitions, where they work at the margin: a more
favorable headquarter location can facilitate an acquisition which would not have gone through
otherwise and vice versa.
The sensitivity of multinational headquarter location to taxes has several policy implica-
tions:24 in order to attract headquarters, more countries may switch to an exemption system
in international taxation or, alternatively, they may lower their corporate tax rates to such
an extent that multinationals are always in an excess tax credit position. This has a similar
effect to exempting dividend repatriations. In that respect, it is not surprising that Japan
and the U.K. have recently decided to largely exempt foreign subsidiaries’ dividends starting
2009 and that the U.S. has repeatedly initiated tax vacations for dividend repatriations like
the American Jobs Creation Act 2004.25
Similarly, our results highlight the cost of tightening their CFC rules. In 2007, the U.K.
proposed a change in CFC rules that would have taxed large parts of worldwide passive
income upon accrual. However, in June 2008, it chose to back down hoping that would stop
U.K. multinationals from relocating their headquarters to Ireland (Kennedy and Rossiter,
2008). In the U.S., President Obama has announced a reform of deferral rules which would
increase taxes on overseas profits. The corporate sector is lobbying strongly to block these
proposals (McKinnon, 2009). If the White House prevails, it would definitely buckle the trend
that corporate taxation has exhibited in most countries over the past decade.
The Commission of the European Communities (2006) discusses the implied constraints on exit taxation.
24The mobility of headquarters also raises intriguing questions with respect to existing concepts of optimal
international taxation. For example, the landmark contributions by Richman (1963) and Feldstein and Hart-
man (1979) develop their insights on the assumption that the firm’s origin is fixed. Also most work surveyed
by Gordon and Hines (2002) takes the firm’s home country as given.
25Furthermore, the U.S. has reduced the number of foreign tax credit baskets from 9 to 2 which facilitates
the averaging of income streams from high and low tax locations.
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Table 1: Multinationals and headquarter relocations
Country Firms Inde- Multi- Head-
pendent nationals quarter
firms relocations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia 2374 1251 76 7
Austria 3305 593 52 2
Belgium 30433 4483 294 21
Bermuda 657 387 63 6
Brazil 778 114 6 2
Canada 1630 866 100 10
Chile 481 88 2 1
Cyprus 184 18 3 1
Czech Republic 8176 312 3 4
Denmark 22729 6309 213 18
Estonia 1651 255 6 1
Finland 8283 933 99 9
France 90783 11427 367 24
Germany 25396 4773 322 30
Hong Kong 346 172 26 2
India 5140 588 47 5
Ireland 16505 3577 84 10
Israel 184 113 28 2
Italy 121006 9390 300 16
Japan 95379 3073 446 3
Lithuania 1243 363 2 2
Luxembourg 1271 171 21 2
Netherlands 52007 1299 290 30
Norway 18778 5193 94 17
Poland 10724 1469 10 1
Russia 36686 14669 10 1
Singapore 2594 609 37 1
South Africa 336 146 27 2
Spain 92611 17729 197 10
Sweden 21975 4834 413 20
Switzerland 1607 449 117 11
United Kingdom 139132 31974 508 43
United States 21023 5506 1158 33
Total 835407 133133 5421 347
Notes: The first column reports the total number of firms registered in the Orbis database in 2005. The
second column reports the number of headquarter firms which are mainly owned by individuals. The third
column reports the number of multinational headquarter firms (with at least one foreign subsidiary). Only
firms with total assets of at least 2 million Euro are taken into account. The fourth column reports the number
of multinationals for which the headquarter relocated to another country as it was acquired by a foreign entity
between 1997 and 2007, where the multinational was registered in the Zephyr database as well as in the Orbis
database.
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Table 3: Methods of double tax relief and CIT rates
Country Double tax Corporate
relief income tax
(1) (2)
Australia Exemption 30.0
Austria Exemption 25.0
Belgium Exemption 34.0
Bermuda Exemption 0.0
Brazil Credit 34.0
Canada Exemption 34.1
Chile Credit 17.0
Cyprus Exemption 10.0
Czech Republic Exemption 26.0
Denmark Exemption 28.0
Estonia Credit 24.0
Finland Exemption 26.0
France Exemption 33.8
Germany Exemption 36.4
Hong Kong Exemption 17.5
India Credit 36.6
Ireland Credit 12.5
Israel Credit 34.0
Italy Exemption 37.3
Japan Credit 42.1
Lithuania Exemption 15.0
Luxembourg Exemption 30.4
Netherlands Exemption 31.5
Norway Exemption 28.0
Poland Credit 19.0
Russia Credit 24.0
Singapore Exemption 20.0
South Africa Exemption 29.0
Spain Exemption 35.3
Sweden Exemption 28.0
Switzerland Exemption 30.0
United Kingdom Credit 30.0
United States Credit 39.4
Notes: The first column reports the standard method of double tax relief for dividends from significant par-
ticipations in presence of a tax treaty. “Credit” indicates that the country provides an ordinary indirect tax
credit. Hence, underlying foreign corporate income taxes are taken into account and excess credits are not
paid out. “Exemption” indicates that the country exempts at least 95 percent of dividend repatriations from
taxation. The second columns reports the statutory corporate income tax rate on domestic income in 2005.
An average rate is reported if the rate varies locally within a country. Source: Chennells and Griffith (1997),
Eurostat (2004), and IBFD (2008).
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Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
yi 2083 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000
t
f
i 2083 0.206 0.203 0.000 1.000
Ci 2083 0.178 0.383 0.000 1.000
Ei 2083 0.822 0.383 0.000 1.000
CFC 2083 0.674 0.469 0.000 1.000
NegTaxi 2083 0.086 0.280 0.000 1.000
NegProfiti 2083 0.254 0.436 0.000 1.000
Xratei 2083 0.028 0.166 0.000 1.000
Sizei 2083 12.067 2.186 0.000 19.134
Assetsi 2083 12.452 2.405 5.231 21.393
Leveragei 2083 0.082 0.118 0.000 0.995
EoAi 2083 0.040 0.091 -0.711 1.336
Hightechi 2083 0.646 0.478 0.000 1.000
Notes: For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Table 8.
Table 7: Relocation versus control group summary statistics
Variable Control Relo- Total
cating sample
t
f
i 0.206 0.207 0.206
Ci 0.182 0.129 0.178
Ei 0.818 0.871 0.822
CFC 0.671 0.714 0.674
NegTaxi 0.084 0.107 0.086
NegProfiti 0.261 0.164 0.254
Xratei 0.028 0.036 0.028
Sizei 12.054 12.243 12.067
Assetsi 12.440 12.612 12.452
Leveragei 0.082 0.080 0.082
EoAi 0.039 0.048 0.040
Hightechi 0.657 0.493 0.646
Sample size 1943 140 2083
Notes: For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Table 8.
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Table 8: Description of variables
Variable Description and data source
yi The dependent variable takes the value one if multinational i relocates its headquarter
to another country between 1997 and 2007. Otherwise the value is zero. Entering the
sample is conditional on availability of financial data. Source of financial data: Orbis
database. Source of relocation data: Zephyr database.
t
f
i Sum of multinational i’s foreign subsidiaries’ tax payments divided by the sum of
its foreign subsidiaries’ pre-tax profits. The value is set to zero if numerator or
denominator are negative or if the implied tax rate is above 100 percent. Source:
Orbis database.
Ci Dummy variable which takes the value one if multinational i’s home country gener-
ally provides foreign tax credits for dividend repatriations. Otherwise the value is
zero. Source: Coopers & Lybrand (1998), IBFD (2008). Previous issues of these
publications were consulted as well.
Ei Dummy variable which takes the value one if multinational i’s home country generally
exempts at least 95 percent of dividend repatriations from taxation. Otherwise the
value is zero. Source: Coopers & Lybrand (1998), IBFD (2008). Previous issues of
these publications were consulted as well.
CFCi Dummy variable which takes the value one if the resident country of the multina-
tional’s ultimate parent firm has controlled foreign corporation rules in year t. Oth-
erwise the value is zero. Source: Sandler (1998), Lang et al. (2004), IBFD (2008).
NegTaxi Dummy variable which takes the value one if the sum of multinational i’s foreign
subsidiaries’ tax payments are negative. Otherwise the value is zero. Source: Orbis
database.
NegProfiti Dummy variable which takes the value one if the sum of multinational i’s foreign
subsidiaries’ pre-tax profits are negative. Otherwise the value is zero. Source: Orbis
database.
Xratei Dummy variable which takes the value one if the implied average effective tax rate of
multinational i’s foreign subsidiaries’ is above 100 percent. Source: Orbis database.
Sizei Logarithm of multinational i’s total turnover in thousands of U.S. dollar. Based
on the sum of unconsolidated parent firm’s and all available subsidiaries’ turnover.
Source: Orbis database.
Assetsi Logarithm of multinational i’s total assets in thousands of U.S. dollar. Based on
the sum of unconsolidated parent firm’s and all available subsidiaries’ total assets.
Source: Orbis database.
Leveragei Ratio of multinational i’s long term debt over total assets. Based on the sum of
unconsolidated parent firm’s and all available subsidiaries’ debt figures and total
assets. Source: Orbis database.
EoAi Profitability measure: Ratio of multinational i’s earnings before interest and taxes
over total assets. Based on the sum of unconsolidated parent firm’s and all available
subsidiaries’ earning figures and total assets. Source: Orbis database.
Hightechi Dummy variable which takes the value one if multinational i’s NACE (Rev 3.1) core
code is categorized as knowledge-intensive or high technology industry according to
OECD and Eurostat classifications (OECD, 2008; Eurostat, 2008). Otherwise the
value is zero. Source: Orbis database.
Hometaxi Top statutory corporate income tax of multinational i’s home country. An average
rate is used if the rate varies locally within a country. Source: Chennells and Griffith
(1997), Eurostat (2004), IBFD (2008).
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Table 9: Estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Split CFC Country-
split rules effect
t
f
i -0.667
(0.563)
Ci × tfi -3.999∗∗∗ -4.218∗∗∗ -3.758∗∗
(1.468) (1.483) (1.809)
Ei × tfi -0.422 -0.432 -0.523
(0.555) (0.557) (0.612)
CFCi 0.323 0.978∗∗
(0.198) (0.426)
NegTaxi 0.614∗ 0.587∗ 0.592∗ 0.528
(0.324) (0.323) (0.324) (0.359)
NegProfiti -0.945∗∗∗ -0.980∗∗∗ -0.992∗∗∗ -1.032∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.289) (0.289) (0.311)
Xratei -0.049 -0.102 -0.110 -0.095
(0.506) (0.505) (0.506) (0.528)
Sizei 0.040 0.055 0.047 0.087∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)
Leveragei -0.383 -0.180 -0.162 -0.128
(0.807) (0.810) (0.806) (0.874)
EoAi 0.134 0.093 0.143 0.332
(0.990) (1.005) (1.017) (0.970)
Hightechi -0.721∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗∗ -0.746∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.179) (0.179) (0.192)
Intercept -2.394∗∗∗ -2.546∗∗∗ -2.649∗∗∗
(0.545) (0.555) (0.557)
N 2083 2083 2083 2016
Log-likelihood -498.2 -493.3 -492.0 -445.7
χ2 30.01 39.68 42.44 99.42
Notes: The dependent variable yi takes the value one if multinational i has relocated its headquarter to another
country between 1997 and 2007. Otherwise yi equals zero. Regressions (1)–(4) are logit regression. Regression
(4) includes a set of country dummy variables. All results are estimated by the maximum likelihood method.
For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Table 8. The χ2 statistic is related to testing for all
coefficients being equal to zero. The corresponding degrees of freedom are equal to the number of regressors in
the specification. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate the significance level: ∗ : 10%,
∗∗ : 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 10: Estimation results — continued
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Home- Only to High-tax Probit Extreme
assets taxrate exemption exemption value
Ci × tfi -3.595∗∗ -3.758∗∗ -7.650∗∗ -8.963∗∗ -2.195∗∗ -1.888∗∗∗
(1.814) (1.808) (3.263) (4.179) (0.933) (0.725)
Ei × tfi -0.513 -0.521 -0.033 -0.244 -0.338 -0.297
(0.612) (0.612) (0.729) (0.848) (0.299) (0.217)
CFCi 0.990∗∗ 0.985∗∗ 0.434 -0.991 0.452∗∗ 0.311∗∗
(0.426) (0.430) (0.691) (1.137) (0.201) (0.143)
NegTaxi 0.517 0.529 0.808∗ 0.839∗ 0.229 0.140
(0.358) (0.359) (0.451) (0.488) (0.179) (0.131)
NegProfiti -1.034∗∗∗ -1.031∗∗∗ -1.163∗∗∗ -0.877∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.311) (0.412) (0.441) (0.150) (0.106)
Xratei -0.070 -0.092 -1.283 -0.918 -0.071 -0.074
(0.528) (0.529) (1.055) (1.063) (0.270) (0.204)
Sizei 0.088∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.031∗
(0.047) (0.060) (0.068) (0.023) (0.017)
Assetsi 0.057
(0.040)
Leveragei -0.118 -0.125 -0.987 -0.263 -0.106 -0.122
(0.862) (0.874) (1.302) (1.399) (0.444) (0.333)
EoAi 0.505 0.319 0.849 1.140 0.085 -0.003
(0.973) (0.975) (1.122) (1.207) (0.486) (0.345)
Hightechi -0.832∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗ -1.037∗∗∗ -0.846∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.192) (0.251) (0.289) (0.096) (0.071)
Hometaxi 0.314
(2.398)
N 2016 2016 2008 2003 2016 2016
Log-likelihood -446.5 -445.6 -290.1 -232.7 -445.7 -445.7
χ2 97.79 99.44 92.25 73.73 99.40 99.34
Notes: The dependent variable yi takes the value one if multinational i has relocated its headquarter to another
country between 1997 and 2007. Otherwise yi equals zero. In regression (7), yi only takes the value one if
multinational i relocated its headquarter to an exemption country. In regression (8), yi only takes the value
one if multinational i relocated its headquarter to an exemption country with a corporate income tax rate not
below 30 percent. Regressions (5)–(8) are logit regression. Regression (9) is a probit regression. Regression (10)
is a binary regression based on the extreme value distribution. All regressions include a set of country dummy
variables and results are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. For detailed variable descriptions and
data sources, see Table 8. The χ2 statistic is related to testing for all coefficients being equal to zero. The
corresponding degrees of freedom are equal to the number of regressors in the specification. Standard errors
are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate the significance level: ∗ : 10%, ∗∗ : 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 11: Estimation results — continued
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Country Cond. logit Cond. logit Cond. logit
plus year country country/ country/
effect industry year
Ci × tfi -3.708∗∗ -3.613∗∗ -3.731∗∗ -3.945∗∗
(1.851) (1.765) (1.884) (1.877)
Ei × tfi -0.545 -0.511 -0.617 -0.596
(0.616) (0.608) (0.641) (0.641)
CFCi 0.933∗∗ 0.974∗∗ 1.018∗∗
(0.470) (0.425) (0.448)
NegTaxi 0.552 0.507 0.611 0.332
(0.360) (0.355) (0.388) (0.387)
NegProfiti -1.042∗∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -1.033∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.308) (0.336) (0.327)
Xratei -0.135 -0.101 -0.160 -0.325
(0.532) (0.522) (0.542) (0.540)
Sizei 0.087∗ 0.086∗ 0.043 0.083∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.050)
Leveragei -0.187 -0.175 -0.130 -0.509
(0.880) (0.854) (1.050) (1.004)
EoAi 0.254 0.326 -1.107 0.087
(0.982) (0.952) (1.247) (1.003)
Hightechi -0.829∗∗∗ -0.800∗∗∗ -0.882∗∗∗ -0.791∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.191) (0.294) (0.197)
N 2016 2016 1682 1409
Log-likelihood -443.5 -416.6 -323.5 -298.8
χ2 103.8 42.66 33.78 32.56
Notes: The dependent variable yi takes the value one if multinational i has relocated its headquarter to another
country between 1997 and 2007. Otherwise yi equals zero. Regression (11) includes a set of country dummy
and a set of year dummy variables. Country and year fixed effects are not reported. Regression (12)–(14)
are conditional logit regressions. In regression (12), the likelihood is maximized conditional on the number of
relocating and immobile multinational headquarters per country. Similarly, in regressions (13) and (14) the
conditioning takes place at the country-industry level and at the country-year level respectively. For detailed
variable descriptions and data sources, see Table 8. The χ2 statistic is related to testing for all coefficients being
equal to zero. The corresponding degrees of freedom are equal to the number of regressors in the specification.
Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate the significance level: ∗ : 10%, ∗∗ : 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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